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AFTER BICHAT
Less than thirty-one years old at the time of his death, Bichat had managed to
acquire a unique position within the Paris school and in the French medical world in
general. He was remembered by many students with great affection and his reputation
as an anatomist and physiologist was enormous. His work left a mark on clinical
teaching and practice that would persist for decades. The members of the Paris
hospitals and clinical school quickly absorbed his ideas on the living body, making the
Anatomie descriptive a textbook for their students. His influence on colleagues and
successors lingered particularly in pathological anatomy, which he had begun to teach
only shortly before his death, basing it upon his tissue theory. Taking their direction
from Bichat, members of the Paris school would add much to the field for the next
forty or so years. Among those who admitted their indebtedness to Bichat were Rene-
Theophile-Hyacinthe Laennec, an anatomist who had worshipped Bichat as a student;
P. J. Roux, the disciple and friend who finished the Anatomie descriptive and who
reputedly kept Bichat's alcohol-preserved head at his side for forty-three years;
Francois-Joseph-Victor Broussais, the inventor of "physiological medicine" and
leader of Paris medicine after 1816; Guillaume Dupuytren, the head ofclinical studies
at the Paris school and a great surgeon; Gaspard-Laurent Bayle, a member of the
"pathological-anatomical" school, as well as many others.'
Furthermore, Bichat's arguments on behalf of the separation of physiology from
the physico-chemical sciences seems to have entrenched itself. Claude Bernard
(1813-78) reported, for example, that the Paris medical school was still imbued with
the "doctrinal errors" of vitalism nearly forty years after Bichat's death. He remem-
bered being reprimanded early in his career by a Professor Gerdy at the Societe
Philomathique for questioning the assumption that living nature is infinitely variable
and hence fundamentally different from the world of physics.2 Bernard eschewed
many of the notions ofthe vitalists and especially that about the capriciousness ofthe
organism. One can safely infer, nevertheless, that Bichat's arguments on that subject
worried him for decades. Indeed, his most famous work, the Introduction to thestudy
ofexperimental medicine published in 1865, was the result ofmany years ofwrestling
with Bichat's ghost concerning the nature of medical science and the methodology
appropriate to it.
The challenge to Bichat's assumptions started before that, however, with Bernard's
mentor Francois Magendie (1783-1855) who, in the 1820s, published annotated edi-
tions of the Traite des membranes and the Recherches physiologiques sur la vie et la
IThe central role of Bichat's anatomical and physiological teaching in post-revolutionary France is
assumed by two authors who deal specifically with medical and clinical teaching in the period. All the
persons mentioned here are discussed in the context in Erwin H. Ackerknecht, Medicine at the Paris
Hospital, 1794-1848, Baltimore, Md., Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967; and Michel Foucault, The
birth ofthe clinic, trans. by A. M. Sheridan, London, Tavistock, 1973.
2 Claude Bernard, Lectures on thephenomena oflife common to animals andplants, trans. by Hebbel E.
Hoff, Roger Guillemin, and Lucienne Guillemin, Springfield, Ill., Charles C Thomas, 1974, p. 41.
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mort which, he remarked, were already classics.3 Magendie praised Bichat's
observational spirit, his experimental genius, and his lucid manner of presenting the
facts. Meanwhile, however, he regretted the uncritical acceptance ofmany of Bichat's
hypotheses and wanted to warn students against them. In the fourth edition of La vie
et la mort, for example, he thundered against the notion ofthe two lives, and objected
to the image of the "animal as a plant clothed in external garb ofthe organs of rela-
tion" on the grounds that it tended to isolate parts and functions which work together
to achieve particular results. For example, Bichat would have it that the muscular
apparatus ofthe animal life passes a lump of food from the mouth to the oesophagus
while that of the organic life moves it through the remainder of the gastrointestinal
tract. As early as 1809, Magendie set out his lifelong theoretical position in Quelques
idees generales sur les phenomenes particuliers aux corps vivants, in which he
criticized vital principles, properties, powers, and forces.' He particularly objected to
Bichat's vital forces, which were unequally distributed and even, in somecases, limited
to particular parts ofthe body. His point was that ifit is a vital property, it ought to be
general, characterizing life everywhere. He argued that all living phenomena can be
explained by two organic characteristics - nutrition, which is a process ofdecomposi-
tion and recomposition; and action, which is particular to each group of organs such
as contraction is to muscles. In effect, Magendie was criticizing the very explanatory
framework in which his predecessors, and especially Bichat, had long laboured.
As his objections to the two lives illustrate, Magendie achieved a new focus for
physiology, addressing himself not to the properties and functions of organs or of
tissues, but to integrated bodilyfunctions. For Bichat, the unit ofphysiology was the
anatomical element. But Magendie started not, for example, with the lung and its
tissues but with respiration, which was achieved with many organs besides just the
lungs. Accordingly, sensibility and contractility ceased to be causal entities as they
were for Bichat and other vitalists and were reduced to mereeffects.'
One need only go to Magendie's Precis elementaire de physiologie of 1825,
however, to get the sense that Bichat's ghost still hovered. Having years before
dismissed sensible organic contractility and other vital forces as gratuitous, he
asserted yet again that they are the "deplorable illusions of modern physiologists"
who believe that "in forging a word like vitalprinciple or vitalJorce, they have done
something analogous to discovering universal gravity".' He was writing in the present
tense ofthe verbs. Georges Cuvier, the great naturalist, would voice similar objections
to the ill-defined and gratuitous vital principles and forces.7 One cannot help but think
I Francois Magendie, in Xavier Bichat's, Recherches physiologiques sur la vie et la mort, 4th ed., Paris,
Gabon Libraire, 1822, esp. pp. v-vii, 4-5, 6-7, 15, 19.
4 Francois Magendie, 'Some general ideas on the phenomena peculiar to living bodies', in William
Randall Albury, 'Experiment and explanation in the physiology ofBichat and Magendie', Stud. Hist. Biol.,
1977, 1:107-115.
1 Ibid.
6 Francois Magendie, Precis ieementaire dephysiologie, Paris, M6quignon-Marvis, 1825, 2nd ed., 2 vol.,
esp. 'Preface', pp. v-xii, and 'Notions preliminaires', pp. 1-32.
7 See Georges Cuvier, 'Histoire de la classe des sciences mathematiques et physiques', Mem. Inst. nat.
Sci. Arts: Sci. Math. phys., 1806, 7: 1-79. A translation of pp. 76-79 is found in Albury, op. cit., note 4
above, pp. 105-106. See also Georges Cuvier, 'De Barthez, de M6dicus, de Deseze, de Cabanis, de Darwin
et de leurs ouvrages', Histoire dessciences naturelles, 5 vols., Paris, Fortin, 1843, vol. 4, pp. 27-46.
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that the words of such men concerning the nature of physiological explanation must
have carried considerable authority. In the final analysis, however, this was really a
quibble over classifications and over the ontological status of certain natural causes
that had been identified to account for phenomena.
Bernard would take on the more fundamental questions having to do with Bichat's
notion of two natural sciences. Bernard's recollection, in 1878, of Professor Gerdy's
reproofsome forty years before, has to do withjust that point. The Introduction to the
study ofexperimental medicine represented a high point in his career. Recognized as
an important document in Bernard's own time, it remains a classic. It contains the
arguments that clinch the case on behalf of one set of laws governing all of nature,
such that physiology is grounded in physico-chemical principles. Hedenied absolutely
any great metaphysical or epistemological gulf such as that which Bichat alleged
separates the science oflife from that ofnon-life.
Conceding that the behaviour of the living organism is, by all appearances,
unpredictable, Bernard warned that all is not what it appears to be. The point is not,
he argued, that there are two separate categories of sciences but rather two separate
environments. Hence Bernard's famous notion of the internal environment (milieu
intierieur) ofthe body, which coexists with the external environment outside the body.
It is at once a simple and elegant answer to the conundrum with which the vitalists had
challenged the mechanists and the reductionists since the seventeenth century. And it
is still taught in physiology courses. Bernard wrote about the internal environment as
follows:
If we limit outselves to the survey of the total phenomena visible from without [a living body], we may
falsely believe that a force in living bodies violates the physico-chemical laws of the general cosmic
environment, just as an untaught man might believe that some special force in a machine, rising in the
air or running along the ground, violated the laws ofgravitation. Now a living organism is nothing but a
wonderful machine endowed with the most marvellous properties and set going by means of the most
complex and delicate mechanism .... In experimentation on inorganic bodies, we need to take account
of only one environment, the external cosmic environment, while in the higher living animals, at least
two environments must be considered, the external or extra-organic environment and the internal or
intra-organic environment .... The great difficulties that we must meet in experimentally determining
vital phenomena and in applying suitable means to altering them are caused by the complexity involved
in the existence of an internal organic environment .... The circulating liquids, the bloodserum and the
intra-organic fluids all constitute the internal environment.'
Bernard wanted to be rid of vitalism in physiology because he believed it to be a
conceptual barrier to experimentation. From the middle oftheeighteenth century, the
Montpellier school had maintained that observation is the sole reliable source ofdata
about living creatures, a view disseminated by the Encyclope'die. As we have seen,
however, Bichat performed many experiments. Nevertheless, Bernard insisted that it
was Magendie who established experimentation in medicine when he attacked
Bichat's vitalism.9 Now the organism can be subjected to experiment, according to
Bernard, because the biological sciences, like the physical ones, aredeterministic. This
8 Claude Bernard, The introduction to the study of experimental medicine, trans. by Henry Copley
Greene, New York, Schuman, 1949, pp. 63-64.
9 Discussed by Albury, op. cit., note 4 above. This was also the claim in J. M. D. Olmsted and E. Harris
Olmsted, Claude Bernard and the experimental method in medicine, Toronto, Abelard-Schuman, 1952, p.
23, where one reads that Magendie was "the pioneer who brought physiology in France back to the experi-
mental method in which it had been established by Harvey in England".
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assures that there is a regularity and hence a predictability in nature. Given the same
conditions, the same phenomena will always be observed. Living phenomena appear
more variable than physical ones only because there are more variables in the internal
environment. Without determinism, biology is not a science:
Absolute determinism exists indeed in every vital phenomenon; hence biological science exists also ....
We must therefore have recourse to analytic study of the successive phenomena of life, and make use of
the same experimental method which physicists and chemists employ in analysing the phenomena of
inorganic bodies. The difficulties which result from the complexity of the phenomena of living bodies
arise solely in applying experimentation; for fundamentally the object and principles of the method are
always thesame.'°
Finally, the exorcism seems to have been accomplished.
Interestingly enough, neither Magendie nor Bernard nor many others denied the
existence of a supra-physical force to account for the apparently purposeful activities
ofthe living body. Two centuries earlier, observation ofthe development ofan embryo
had confirmed William Harvey's vitalistic assumptions at the very time when other
men were taking his circulatory theory to be supportive of iatromechanism. While
protesting that the embryonic changes are in accordance with the "physico-chemical
conditions proper to vital phenomena", Bernard permitted himselfto speculate about
the existence of a "developing organic force", the "guiding idea of the vital evolu-
tion", and a "creative vital force"." Life, it would seem, is still greater than the sum of
its parts, causing the most committed determinist to bow before its complexity and
mystery. On the other hand, neither Magendie nor Bernard treated this force or idea
as a hypothesis to be tested. Nor did they speculate about its essential nature.
It is perhaps worth remarking that between 1800 and 1865 the amount of light
which physics and chemistry could shed on physiological questions had increased
enormously, making it easier for Bernard to affirm his arguments. In 1800,
Lavoisier's experiments demonstrating the quantitative analogy between respiration
and combustion were the single notable application of chemistry and physics to
physiology. That demonstration had not been enough, however, to deflect Bichat from
his conviction that there is no correspondence between the organic and inorganic
realms of nature. Whereas Lavoisier had argued that control of bodily temperature
occurs in the lungs, Bichat came nearer thetruth by locating it in thecapillaries, alleg-
ing that the various organs and parts separate caloric from food and air by means of
their insensible organic contractility. Bichat took the fact that most animals maintain
a temperature different from their surroundings as an affirmation that living and inert
nature are separate realms. It was left to Justus von Liebig, a vitalist, to account for
animal heat in an entirely satisfactory manner and thus to solve one of the most
fundamental and long-standing mysteries surrounding life. By means of painstaking
analytical work recorded in his Animal chemistry of 1840, he showed that heat is
produced by the oxidation or combustion offood.
By the mid-nineteenth century, vital forces were no longer part ofthe commonplace
10 For Bernard's views on determinism in physiology, see op. cit., note 2 above, pp. 16-45. The
relationship of the notions of Bernard, Bichat, and others to the problems associated with respiration and
animal heat is discussed by June Goodfield, Thegrowth ofscientificphysiology, London, Hutchinson, 1960,
pp. 135-364. Paul Bert gives Bernard credit for introducing determinism into biology in the 'Introduction'
to op. cit., note 8 above, pp. xiii-xix.
" Goodfield, op. cit., note 10 above, p. 161.
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language of physiology, having given way to physico-chemical images adapted to the
organic world. It was not a question of mechanist arguments disproving vitalist ones.
It was, rather, that such vitalist convictions as remained had less and less effect upon
the experiments or observations of the physicians. In the eighteenth century, the
language of animism and especially vitalism addressed the life ofthe organism itself.
Claiming for themselves the mantle of Newtonianism and sound scientific method
generally, the vitalists concerned themselves specifically with those features of
organisms which distinguish them from non-living matter. They remarked that what
had to be addressed was not so much that ourglands filter humours likesieves, or that
the heart is a pump, or that the vessels are tubes ofmoving liquid, but that all the parts
are acting in response to needs and want, conscious and unconscious, which act to
achieve some integrated goal. The living individual is greater than the sum ofits parts.
Because they addressed the sensation and the motion belonging to the living body,
animists and vitalists helped create the science of physiology. In the eighteenth
century, its images were necessarily vitalistic because their formulators wanted to
have the measure ofthat which makes life unique. Their iatromechanist predecessors
resorted to mechanical images because they yearned for the certitude that they
perceived to belong to physics and mechanics.'2
While it is true, as students and even scientists are apt to affirm, that the nineteenth
century reverted to mechanistic explanations of living phenomena, it was not because
they finally shook off the last vestiges of a simpler age. Rather, it was because,
possessing its own language thanks to the labour ofthe vitalists, physiology was finally
able to adapt a rapidly developing physics and chemistry to its purposes. It was
grounded in experiment and in physico-chemical assumptions, as Magendie and
Bernard were convinced it must be, but the techniques are special. It was biophysics
and biochemistry. The lessons of the Montpellier vitalists, and especially of Bichat,
had not been lost after all.
It is occasionally pointed out that the mechanist-vitalist debate surfaces still. While
that is true, it has nothing to do with empirical work or with its interpretation. It is
rather a transcendental question having to do with whether one believes that an
individual, a species, or all of living nature is merely an evolutionary accident, the
ultimate product of some chance cosmic collision, or whether some goal or purpose
lies behind it all. The scientist in his laboratory does not frame his questions in
response to vitalist or mechanist convictions, for they are matters of faith or inclina-
tion and not testable hypotheses. Therefore, all scientists have been mechanists in
their laboratories for at least the last one and a halfcenturies.
The tissue theory, as introduced into anatomy in the late eighteenth century, also
gave way to advances in physics and chemistry. The product of the method of
"analysis" as expounded by Condillac, and flourishing briefly because of a growing
interest in pathology, it was superseded by cellular theory. The tissue was displaced in
its role as the ultimate unit of life by the cell. Partly, of course, it was because
advances in microscopy in the 1830s made identification ofcells possible. But it is also
true that as sensibility and irritability were demoted from physiological causes into
12 This is the point basic to Francois Duchesneau, La physiologie deslumiieres: empiricisnie. mnodee.s et
theories, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1982.
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mere effects, the units which bore them in the former instance were also diminished in
status in the body. People still speak of tissues and Bichat's description of their
qualities and distribution remains good and thorough anatomy. Nevertheless, tissues
are themselves but compounds of living units.
As is usually the case with origins, it is difficult to say just when and where the
cellular theory originated. The English botanist Robert Brown observed in 1832 that
there are pockets or cells in plants and that every cell contains a nucleus. In 1838, a
paper entitled 'Beitrage zur Phytogenesis', appeared in MuIlers Archiv. It was by
Matthias Schleiden, a botanist in Johannes Muiller's famous Berlin laboratory, and it
described the plant as a community ofcells and each individual cell as the "foundation
ofthe vegetable world". Schleiden described Brown's nucleus as a "cytoblast" or kind
ofregenerative centre ofthe cell.
In the same laboratory, the zoologist Theodore Schwann undertook to look for
cells in all living tissues, thereby expanding Schleiden's work into a general theory
about the basis and origin of living phenomena. The credit for clearly defining the
cell's character as an independent living unit properly belongs to still another of
Muller's students, Rudolf Virchow. His Cellularpathologie of 1858 discusses the cell
as the basic unit of disease, much as Pinel and Bichat had discussed the membranes
and tissues as the seat of illness. Virchow also established the crucial point that all
cells spring from pre-existing cells and thus life perpetuates itself. The concept of the
cell as a structural unit common to all forms of life was one of those grand unifying
notions that was immediately successful because it took account of great complexity
with an efficiency ofbasic explanation.
Until recently, Bichat has tended to be a somewhat confusing and even vague figure
in medical history. On the one hand, there has been a conviction that his work is
important, as much as anything because his successors, especially in France, had
flattered it and responded to it with enthusiasm. In spite of his very short working life,
his approach to anatomy and physiology mightily influenced a school of pathology
and left its mark on the regenerated post-revolutionary medical institutions of France.
His viewpoints and accomplishments, however, had to do with nineteenth-century
developments only indirectly. As we have seen, for persons like Magendie and
Bernard, his work was a place from which to commence the development ofcontrary
viewpoints. His insights, therefore, enjoyed only a transitory applicability, giving way
quickly to new observations and conceptions. What makes his work worth studying
for our purposes is that it is so elegant and thorough an integration of the major
themes that run through the eighteenth century. Bichat inherited his vitalistic convic-
tions from a long line of investigators who took issue with the simplistic
iatromechanism of the early eighteenth century. Flawed though they were shown to be
subsequently, his arguments positing variable living phenomena against predictable
physico-chemical ones summarized a position to which many assented. Their
ontological status aside, the five vital properties very successfully described living
behaviour, at least for a time. Armed with his sensationalist methodology, Bichat
achieved a remarkably unified and coherent system. Subsequent advances came about
partly because Bichat's critics of the nineteenth century were forced to address his
persuasive challenges to mechanism and determinism.
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